Within that region, anti-communist pressures created by the events of have forcefully rehabilitated the concept of the nation- state. That fact explains why nationalist and ethnocentric rhetoric is not marginal there, but is rather an axis that structures public life, especially in a post-communist context that grants civil society only a minor role in the political process. Once the repudiation of elites and popular disen- chantment with politicians are factored in, it is hardly surprising that East Central European society increasingly leans toward the right, despite the meager electoral results enjoyed by some radical right parties see figure 2.
In that regard, the radical right in Central and Eastern Europe is more mainstream than marginal, while at the same time being more extreme than its counterparts in the West. In Western Europe, the major challenge involves signifi- cant shifts in public discourse and policies concerning immigration and integration and, more generally, the politics of multiculturalism. This trend represents a major shift from earlier patterns in which estab- lished actors ostracized such positions.
The organizational and electoral consolidation of the radical right has progressed substantially in France and Belgium. In both countries, the radical right remains isolated, yet parts of its agenda have entered mainstream politics, most notably during the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. Efforts by conservative parties in Denmark and Austria to co-opt the electoral rise and relative pragmatism of the radical right have given even greater legitimacy to these parties.
More generally, right-wing organizational strength, party and movement mobilization, and public openness to immigrants and immigration have begun to exhibit systematic variations across national boundaries. As far as Scandinavian countries are concerned, strong right-wing populist parties have become entrenched in Denmark and Norway, while immi- grant-related violence has shaken public opinion, most dramatically in Norway, but also in Sweden as well.
At the same time, the citizens of these countries are not as deeply or formally opposed to immigration and multiculturalism as is the case in other parts of Europe see Figures 2 and 3. In those countries, although the incidence of right-wing violence remains lower, radical right parties have enjoyed disproportionate success.
As a result of the current financial crisis, that trend has intensified in some countries, such as Greece. In contrast to Western Europe, the challenges in East Central Europe are more fundamental, as they concern not only the politics of minorities but also the political order itself.
Hungary offers a case in point. Other countries in which the radical right entered the government Poland, Slovakia, and Romania also experienced dramatic ruptures in their politics, albeit to a lesser degree than in Hungary.
In the East, there was never a cordon sanitaire between the mainstream right and the radical right; hence the boundaries between them are more fluid.
The rehabilitation of nationalism after the breakdown of the Soviet empire facilitated political protagonists and programs that tended to make a radical right largely superfluous. Stutt- gart: ebd. Brubaker, Rogers. Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Heitmeyer, Wilhelm. Minkenberg, Michael. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, , pp. Berlin: de Gruyter, , pp. Mudde, Cas. Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe.
Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, Pew Research Center. Elite Discourse and Racism. London: Sage, Right-wing Extremism in Post-war Europe. West Euro- pean Politics, vol. Zick, Andreas, et al.
Although far-right parties to date have not been able to gain a foothold at the national level, the seemingly unanimous condemnation of right-wing extremism by no means has spelled the end of far-right activity. The proliferation of such assaults underlines the fact that violent right-wing extremism in Germany does not simply involve a few in- dividuals acting on their own. Hardly a trivial matter, it is actually a complex internal security issue.
What does it look like today? What are its enabling structures? The actors 1. The NPD was founded in Twelve years after the banning of the successor party to the Nazis, the Sozialistische Reichspartei Socialist Reich Party , the NPD managed to unite several far-right splinter groups in addition to the Deutsche Reichspartei German Reich Party , which already had been banned in Rhineland-Palatinate.
Between and , the young party won enough votes to enter seven state parliaments. But surprisingly, its performance in the elections was anemic: it scored a measly 4. In the year that he was elected, the party drafted a new manifesto, the contents of which were revised slightly in Fundamentally National Socialist and nationalistic, the mani- festo features anti-capitalist and national-revolutionary elements and advocates National Socialism.
The NPD is openly anti-establishment, and propagates a biologically derived theory of race that culminates in race-based political demands, such as the expropriation and deportation of Germans with an immigrant background. Having achieved those goals, the party sought to accomplish its third pillar of winning elections, first 6 Cf.
For- merly a party composed more or less exclusively of aging ex-Nazis, today the NPD actively courts young people, offering them among other in- ducements leisure activities and free music CDs. When right-wing songs are banned, as happens occasionally, the party capitalizes upon that censorship to promote itself. Exhibit 1 is a cover from one of those CDs. However, the pact ended with the not agreed-upon participation of the NPD in the Brandenburg parliamentary elections in The NPD emphasized the censorship in an advertising campaign and removed banned songs from its download area.
Subcultural activities also help the NPD to avoid the repressive instruments that the state usually deploys against neo-Nazi organizational structures and activities.
The German state certainly has legal means at its disposal to impose a ban upon the party, but the first attempt to do so, in , did not succeed, which has discouraged further efforts. Based on the ideological structure and objectives of the NPD, a ban should be legally possible. However, some observers especially in the Green Party have cast doubts on the legitimacy of a party ban on moral grounds.
A significant discrepancy exists between its com- munications with voters such as its electoral manifestos and pledges 13, in which it comes across as relatively moderate, and its more radical internal communications such as its educational brochures for cadres.
By , the party had developed a stable, highly active grassroots presence in some areas, especially parts of East Germany heavily affected by demographic change. The inroads made by the NPD in these regions are reflected in the number of seats it has won on city and municipal councils. It also has had electoral success at the state level, with representatives in the parliaments of Saxony winning 9. In Thuringia 4. It should be noted that all of these states are located in the former East Germany.
But despite all these body blows, the NPD remains the most successful far-right party in Germany as of this writing. But in the meantime, the government announced that it would not participate in the move to outlaw the NPD. Drawing its sustenance from national-conservative traditions, the DVU was founded as an association in and as a party in The party has always born the stamp of its founder, financier, and long-time chair- man, the millionaire Gerhard Frey.
In the s it had managed to recruit a relatively large number of members some 26, by , but by its membership had dwindled to only around 1, In the s and again at the start of the new millennium it achieved some significant — albeit mostly short-lived — electoral triumphs in Schleswig- Holstein 6.
Die Republikaner reached the zenith of their influence from the mids to the mids, when they were extremely right-wing. Under the current party chair- man Rolf Schlierer, who has been in office since , the party has followed a more conservative, less radical line. Al- though they have not yet achieved any major electoral victories, the Pro parties frequently draw public attention with their anti-Muslim campaigns.
But the Pro parties are not only hostile to Muslims; they also portray the Roma and immigrants generally in a stereotyped, demeaning manner. However, it was gradually taken over by partisan, right-wing activists beginning in the new millennium.
In , the party won four seats on the Cologne city council, with 4. In the municipal election in Cologne in August, , Pro Cologne won 5. Pro Cologne is currently the most successful of a number of populist right-wing and far-right voting blocs. Similarly, the agenda of the Freedom Party, which in its message and political alignment echoes the Dutch Wilders Party, focuses on campaign- ing against Islam and Muslims.
How- ever, it has since formed several state associations. With provocative campaigns and right-wing populist gestures, its protagonists seek to connect with the media and the public. However, they have recorded successes at the municipal and regional levels. Representatives of far-right parties sit on some district, city, and municipal councils. The NPD has recorded a high percentage of the vote in municipal elections in Saxony 26; 72 seats and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 60 seats , but it is also represented at the municipal level in other states as well, including Hesse, Thuringia, and Saxony-Anhalt.
To be sure, when viewed from a broader perspective, the far-right parties have enjoyed little success. Still, the far right has shown a knack for entrenching itself in some areas at the local and, to a lesser extent, the regional level. Movements and subcultures As is the case with extreme right-wing parties, there is a heterogeneous network of far-right groups and activities in Germany.
The evolution of such movements and subcultures suggests that the German far right, especially the wing committed to action rather than speech, has been able to reinvent itself in recent years. We have seen already that the frag- mentation and radicalization of right-wing extremism during the s and s gave rise to new parties such as the DVU and die Republikaner.
This pro-Nazi attitude is evident in their adaptation of the ideology, the glorification of individual figures of National Socialism such as Hitler and Hess , the use of corresponding symbols, and the imitation of old Nazi organizations such as the SA and SS. However, they exploited the power vacuum that emerged during the collapse of East Germany to build neo-Nazi structures in its territory.
During this period numerous other neo-Nazi organizations were founded. Existing battle groups also shifted their activities to the states of the former East Germany.
Since that time such groups have gone without state certification as legally recog- nized associations or the like for their organizations. It also embodies a conscious strategy by which the neo-Nazis try to distinguish themselves from other far-right parties. The Free Forces wanted to place them- selves unreservedly in the ideological tradition of National Socialism and, accordingly, they look to Nazi organizations and right-wing terrorist groups such as the Hoffmann Military Sports Group as their militant role models.
Comradeship members include militant neo-Nazis, aggressive right-wing rockers, and right-wing youths. The groups are often responsible for vio- lent attacks and establishing no-go zones. However, they usually attract public attention only when weapons are found on their members or if they carry out terrorist activities.
As a result that comradeship was classified as a terrorist organization. Links Verlag, First emerging in Berlin and Dortmund, this network has spread throughout Germany. Members of these groups, who tend to be very young age 14 and up , adopt the style of dress and in some cases even the habits of their left-wing counterparts, particularly those of the autonomous Schwarzer Block Black Block.
The Autonomous Nationalists focus on contemporary concerns, demanding such things as better economic prospects for German youth. The group reaches out to young people in precarious situations with offers of employment and shelter for example, overnight accommodation for children brought up in institutions.
In this sense, their criticisms of current social ills are based on real experience. However, the member turnover rate is very high.
Many adherents leave the movement after just a few months, and in some areas the organizations have dissolved completely by this time. Right: Wulff and police officer. Nine years later, Heimattreue Deutsche Jugend German Youth Faithful to the Homeland likewise was outlawed for its militant, aggressive op- position to the constitutional order. Later the flag was removed and entered into evidence. Neo-Nazis proceded to target Mannichl for abuse. In December, , Mannichl was the victim of a violent attack.
Recently, the neo-Nazi Christian Worch founded Die Rechte the Right , an organization that offers a political home to militant right-wing extremists. The newly formed organization has been designed as a political party and could eventually offer some competition to the NPD or even replace it, if that party should be banned.
It has never been easy to arrest and convict the perpetrators of right-wing terrorist acts or even to offer an objective analysis of their enabling structures, as became clear in two incidents that occurred in Bavaria: the Levin-Poeschke murder in Erlangen and the attack on the Oktoberfest in Munich in the same year.
Acting on tips from the public, they traced the robbers to a rented mobile home, where the pair allegedly shot themselves before they could be taken into custody. The group, made up of neo-Nazis who were drawn together around the time of German reunification, had been active for about a decade, killing at least ten people, including nine individuals with immigrant back- grounds and one police woman.
The apparent purpose of the executions 30 Cf. The NSU also committed assault and battery against many others, including passers- by in multicultural cities and at least one police officer;31 carried out bomb attacks two or more in Cologne ; and robbed a minimum of fif- teen banks and one food discounter. The terrorists used the stolen money to finance a range of neo-Nazi activities. The Federal Prosecutor General is currently conducting preliminary in- vestigative proceedings against the NSU for the formation and financing of a terrorist organization see Exhibit 3, below.
She turned herself in to the police. According to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the trial venue must be in one of the federal states in which the NSU crimes were committed, and five of the ten murders occurred in Bavaria. The evidence suggests that militant right-wing extremism involves not just a few individuals acting on their own, but a complex network.
A case in point is furnished by an audio recording of a conversation in which two prominent neo-Nazis, Thorsten Heise see section 1. Over the course of that conversation, the participants indicate that the men are living underground and that money intended to have been sent to the trio might have gone missing.
One can confirm this observation by examining far-right publications and musical texts. The song praises the crimes committed by the NSU, as the fol- lowing lyrics demonstrate: Nine times he has done it now. The SoKo Bosporus36 sounds the alarm. The investigators are under pressure.
A bloody trail and no one stops The phantom. Their existence was not revealed by the BKA in the NSU debate, but rather was disco- vered by chance in December of , when members of the investigation committee searched through the files.
He comes, he kills and he disappears. More exciting than any thriller, They are hunting the kebab killer. Nine times he has brutally killed, But his joy of killing is not yet satisfied. Profilers await the next murder. The question is only when and where.
Following the public debate about the NSU, the Pink Panther song was played to promote solidarity at, among other events, a neo-Nazi demonstration in Munich. After legal action was taken, this practice declined, at least in public settings. Neo-Nazi groups also sponsor a variety of far-right recreational events, such as concerts, which are especially attractive to young sympathizers and supporters.
This salute is also banned today, and those who perform it face criminal pro- secution. The Immortals — neo-Nazis wearing costumes with white masks and black clothing — march at night with torches through empty streets. These torchlight parades, which are recorded, create a powerful visual aesthetic. Through them, the neo-Nazis seek to demonstrate strength and touch the emotions of viewers on the Internet.
Relevant activities can be viewed on neo-Nazi blogs, and on YouTube, at any time and by anyone. The Web is indeed becoming more and more central as a means of com- munication and information in the far-right milieu. In the German jugendschutz. Social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and the microblogging 45 Among far-right websites, were associated with neo-Nazi comradeships, 63 were associated with groups of Autonomous Nationalists, and 52 served specifically to mobilize certain campaigns or right-wing events.
It emphasizes, according to one interpretation, that neo-Nazis do not see themselves as terrorists, but as defenders of German national identity against all threats to it, including the Federal Republic itself. The NSU murders were therefore not acts of terrorism, but of liberation. According to another interpreta- tion of the statement, accusations of murder and terrorism are regarded by right-wing extremists as baseless attacks by enemies. This dismissal of evidence ties in with the classic modus operandi of neo-Nazis: denying guilt, adopting the role of victims, and spreading conspiracy theories.
Hatred against Jews, in some cases personified and illustrated, is also a particular feature of neo-Nazi websites. Violence, criminal acts, and victims Since the revolution in , the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the dissolu- tion of the German Democratic Republic, the number of far-right crimi- nal and violent acts has increased dramatically.
The death toll caused by far-right violence has reached at least ; meanwhile, there have been a much larger number of injuries both physical and psychological, many of them severe. These often-deadly attacks underline the capacity of the far right to inflict grievous harm disproportionate to the meager electoral support that it has garnered. In October, the Federal Minister of the Interior Hans-Peter Friedrich of the CSU declared to the press that, in addition to the three known NSU affiliates who had gone on the lam to avoid capture, there were open arrest warrants for other right-wing extremists in hiding.
The vast majority of these 11, were propaganda crimes. According to the Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution, an average of 2. These offenses primarily involved the commission of bodily harm. A murder attempt was registered almost every other month. These differences are particular- ly controversial when it comes to the number of deaths. The German government had registered 48 murders since , which it corrected to 58 following the February, discovery of the NSU murders.
But 50 Cf. Obviously, crimes that have been reported subsequently and those that have not been reported or recorded at all are not considered here. They point out that crimes of prejudice, and in particular racist acts, are often ignored by official bodies, usually because the per- petrators could not be assigned to a far-right group and therefore the relevant act was not recorded as racist.
One can detect insensitivity to unequal treatment in police publications with discriminatory content for example, against the Roma and in situations involving the abuse of people in police cus- tody. Although the Red Army Fraction, a left-wing group, is still blamed for one murder in , the culprit was never caught, so this matter remains controversial. Enabling structures German right-wing extremism in recent decades appears to be innovative and flexible except where its ideological framework is concerned.
The extent of far-right violence in Germany and its consistency since are astonishing, particularly since German legislation on the subject has not kept up with the times, and because the general public usually ignores the whole matter. The collapse of East Germany and with it the destruction of values and authorities accepted as legitimate, or at least adhered to for opportunistic reasons, also posed a particular challenge for the people in East Germany, above all for youths searching for an identity.
Many Germans, especially those who reside in the former Democratic Republic, are ambivalent about the social and economic changes that have taken place before and after the turn of the century.
While some people have profited from the opportunities ushered in by the informa- tion age and globalization, others fear that they will be left behind. This fear is well founded, as almost a quarter of current school dropouts have poor verbal and quantitative skills and an equally poor grasp of the natural sciences, and therefore find it difficult to deal successfully with the realities of everyday life.
They may also lack even the basic prerequisites for vocational training. Other analyses of the attitudes of NPD voters yield similar results. A further characteristic is that it is primarily young men who vote for far-right parties. But these data furnish little more than a starting point for explaining the phenomenon and of course do not reflect any essential characteristics.
What is needed here is an interpretation of the data offering ex- planations from multiple viewpoints and featuring a multi-dimensional analysis. Far-right attitudes are also more likely to thrive in sparsely populated areas than in major cities. Such places tend to have relatively few immigrants, many older people, considerable out-migration, and an abundance of young men who have been left behind without any real prospects. But right-wing dominance is also solidified by certain decisions made by local politicians e.
Schellenberg, Die Rechtsextremismus-Debatte, op. Problem actors: investigative and security authorities The spread of German right-wing extremism and the dire consequences it may entail point to something deeper than merely the strategic in- ventiveness of its advocates.
The innovative restructuring of the scene towards a strongly subculture-oriented movement that, whenever pos- sible, forgoes fixed and registered organizational structures is also a reaction to the repressive state instruments used against neo-Nazi groups and activities. The failure of authorities consistently to prosecute the real criminals and to prevent the commission of criminal acts points not only to the fact that far-right groups are often unregistered; it also points to massive weaknesses in the German security apparatus as such.
One must also look at the well being of people who are potential victims of far-right violence. In some cases, the victims of far-right violence are unable to enlist any support in their municipalities and feel inhibited about publicly discussing racism and extremism. That mistake came as a painful shock to much of German society. Apparently, racist prejudices and agenda-setting within the law enforcement community can prevent far- right acts of violence from being recognized, strengthen far-right inter- pretations of the world in public debates, and ultimately contribute to the spread of extremism at the local level.
But in any case one has the impression that the authorities do not wish the extent of the problem to become widely known. This is the only plausible explanation for the shredder affairs and the concealment of relevant material. It also came to light that the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and some of its counterparts at the state level had been shredding documents that contained relevant material on right-wing extremism before they could be read by members of the investigative committee or used by the Federal Prosecutor General.
Some of the files concern recruitment activities in the early s, including suspected recruitment attempts or possible employment relationships of the NSU trio that went into hiding and other persons from the NSU scene including files on confidential informers in Thuringia.
The fact that the Federal Office for the Protec- tion of the Constitution paid right-wing extremists as informers is un- disputed; the obvious suspicion that right-wing extremists associated with the NSU e. The suspicion that this did not just concern a few individuals, but that the links between the security authorities and the NSU network are multi-layered, is supported by information discovered 72 To date, these have been established in the Bundestag as well as in Berlin, Saxony, Bavaria, and Thuringia.
Six G10 files were subsequently destroyed. These included file AO, consisting of records of extensive wiretapping measures against Thomas S. Evidently, their prejudices affected the ways in which they perceived the evidence before them. During hearings on these matters, Dr. The attack came near the end of the hearing, after committee chairman Sebastian Edathy posed a hypothetical question to him: whether the investigations into the murders of nine citizens with foreign family histories would have proceeded in the same way if the victims had been nine business executives.
In recent years, attacks originating from the far right of American politics have targeted religious and ethnic minorities, with a series of antigovernment militants, religious extremists, and lone-wolf mass shooters inspired by. This book highlights recent developments in the radical right providing comparative analysis of current extremist activity in Eastern and Western Europe and the United States.
It reveals the growing amount of connections and continuities of rightwing movements and ideologies across national borders. Subjects covered include: Who joins radical right parties. This book discusses right-wing extremism by analysing Germanophone research on this topic for the first time in English, including unique survey data from Germany and Austria.
Highlighting how questions of terminology can become complicated when country cases are compared, the authors analyse theoretical and methodological issues in relation to the. How a more positive form of identity politics can restore public trust in government Illiberalism, Thomas Main writes, is the basic repudiation of liberal democracy, the very foundation on which the United States rests.
It says no to electoral democracy, human rights, the rule of law, toleration. It is a. Research on the extreme right is rare, and the extreme right has even more rarely been analysed as a social movement. Some features of the site may not work correctly.
The far-right impact on mainstream politics could be recently observed in Warsaw, when in September a mass street demonstration was organized jointly by the PiS, Solidarity trade union and the far-right Radio Maryja… Expand. Save to Library Save. Create Alert Alert. Share This Paper. This process is further supported by shared ideological writings, technological advancement, and the conflict in Ukraine, which has served as a powerful accelarator.
In recent years, analysts and security institutions alike have pointed out that right-wing extremists are increasingly networking across borders and even continents. The same is true for personal connections and friendships. But they, too, are part of the phenomenon in question here. This article seeks to shed light on how these connections occur and are fostered. In doing so, it does not focus solely on potential terrorist or even militant networks.
Rather, the aim is to discover which factors have proven conducive to connecting right-wing extremists across borders. As will be shown, among these factors are shared ideas old and new as well as advancements in technology and occasions for physical get-togethers, ranging from seemingly harmless concerts to paramilitary training and actual fighting in a war zone.
This article is based on an eight-month investigation that was originally conducted by a team of journalists at Die Zeit , a German newsweekly. This article will first explore how a very basic and by no means new idea—creating civil unrest in order to upend the current political order—has spread across the globe and taken on new importance as a galvanizing factor for the international extreme far-right.
It will then go on to explore several case examples and factors that have contributed, or helped to facilitate, international cooperation among right-wing extremists. These examples and factors include the role of the conflict in Ukraine, the effectiveness of the recruitment drive of the American violent neo-Nazi group The Base, the nexus between online and offline radicalization, and the importance of the Russian extreme right-wing group Russian Imperial Movement RIM as a hub for the globalization.
Old and New Ideas It is noteworthy that even as the global right-wing extremist movement is making more and more use of modern technology e. James Mason was just 14 when he joined the youth wing of the American Nazi Party, and he later went on to became one of the most influential right-wing extremists in the United States.
In , his essays were published in the form of a book called Siege. The classic fascist groups and parties of the 20th century were hierarchical, with a leader at the top, chains of command, and military structures. In Siege , though, James Mason presents a different concept: Ideally, people would organize in small cells. One case in point is Atomwaffen Division. There is a photo from showing James Mason together with 12 male members of the group.
The men are kneeling or standing around him, all wearing camouflage and skull masks. Founded in , the neo-Nazi group is one of the most hardcore in the world, with AWD members in the United States suspected of having committed five murders. Mason, who is nearly 70 years old, maintains that he is no longer politically active.
But when a reporter from the Die Zeit reporting team visited him at his home in Denver, Colorado, in November , he appeared to be very proud of the fact that he still is an inspiration to right-wing extremists across the globe. As a matter of fact, AWD now has offshoots in a number of countries, including Germany. In the spring of , Mason announced that Atomwaffen Division was disbanding, 12 but that was likely just a tactical move to alleviate the pressure of FBI investigations.
At the same time, though, Mason seemed to choose his words with care to avoid saying anything that could be interpreted as an incitement to violence. Mason claimed to no longer believe in the idea of right-wing terror.
That is clearly true. One example of the salience of Siege was a hidden digital copy found when German police searched the house of right wing extremist Fabian D.
Felix Oberhuber, e another German national who used to be a right-wing extremist and for years tried to reach the battlefield in Ukraine as a foreign fighter, also studied Siege in the process of his radicalization.
The American neo-Nazi group The Base, which is closely ideologically aligned with Atomwaffen, considered Siege compulsory reading for prospective members as did many other groups. In the past, explains extremism expert Alexander Ritzmann, right-wing extremists were focused on the fight for their own country.
Mason is not the only ideologist who has had an impact on this broadening of the horizon of the right-wing extremist movement in recent years, h but it seems fair to say that Siege in this sense provides an important component of the ideological glue that helps the movement connect across what used to be almost insurmountable borders.
The Role of the Conflict in Ukraine It is no coincidence that the CEP mentions the year explicitly as an important date in the context of the globalization of the right-wing extremist movement. The conflict in Ukraine that started that year has had a tremendous mobilizing effect.
Most of these seem to have been young men of Russian or Ukrainian heritage or origin living away from the motherland.
Not all, but many of the foreign recruits were and are right-wing extremists. Experts believe that from Germany alone, as many as volunteers headed for Ukraine to fight in the war—on both sides of the front. The Die Zeit investigation attempted to find out more about the pull-factors involved and to learn about the networks that facilitate the actual recruitment process. Felix Oberhuber not his real name , a year-old German national from the southern part of the country, was one of those who tried to join the war in Ukraine.
In several personal interviews, he shared his story with Die Zeit. The team of reporters were able to cross-check and verify most of the information he gave them and consider him reliable. Oberhuber recalls that as a teenager, he drank a lot and got high—and he developed an interest in documentaries about the Nazi era. By the time he turned 18, he was active in more than 35 right-wing extremist WhatsApp groups, where he received reading recommendations, like pamphlets about people who attacked foreigners as well as the aforementioned book Siege by James Mason.
He radicalized further, beat up foreigners, and planned an attack on leftists with his comrades. The planned attack did not pan out, largely because they were unable to obtain weapons.
But Oberhuber continued to be fascinated by violence and stumbled across the Azov Battalion on the internet. The German turned out to be a functionary with Misanthropic Division, which tried to recruit fighters for the Azov Battalion in Ukraine j in a number of countries. Oberhuber was electrified. In , Oberhuber moved to the town of Weissenfels, in the German state of Saxony-Anhalt, into the apartment of a Misanthropic Division functionary.
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